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     For experiments designed to investigate whether an animal has a particular 
psychological, social, or normative property had by humans, researchers use Neyman 
& Pearson’s (1928;1967) hypothesis testing methods, and generally formulate the null 
hypothesis such that the animal is said not to have the property in question. When a 
purportedly human property is attributed to an animal without prior methodologically 
sound investigation of this sort, that attribution is considered anthropomorphic. In the 
current debate about the role of anthropomorphism in animal cognition research, some 
scholars have raised the concern that the standard psychological methods result in a bias 
against attributing properties to animals when those properties are seen as somehow 
specially human (Sober 2005, de Waal 1999)—special because they are psychological, 
social, or normative properties that have been identified as potential markers for human 
uniqueness.  
     One division among animal cognition researchers is between those who emphasize 
the similarities between humans and nonhuman animals (especially when it comes to the 
great apes), and those who emphasize the differences (who we will call “selective 
skeptics”1 ). Both camps justify their position by appeal to evolutionary considerations. 
The ethologist Frans de Waal, for example, argues that when we see similarities in 
behavior between humans and other apes, we should expect to see similarities in 
cognitive processes and functions, because the similarities in behavior suggest that the 
individuals derived from a common ancestor 2 . Other animal cognition researchers, such 
as the psychologist Daniel Povinelli, express great concern about this way of describing 
other species, worrying that some animal cognition researchers are too eager to 
undermine claims of human uniqueness3 . For selective skeptics, the null hypothesis is 
that animals do not have human-like cognitive systems, social relations, or normative 
properties.  Further, at least some selective skeptics claim that current research supports 
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such hypotheses (despite the methodological prohibition against affirming the null, 
which we will discuss below).
     We argue that the special worry about anthropomorphism as expressed by selective 
skeptics is a bias. We do two things. First we challenge the idea that the special human 
properties can be unproblematically identified, and hence that the null hypothesis can be 
unproblematically stated. Second, we argue that the correct application of the Neyman 
& Pearson methodology does not justify a special worry about anthropomorphism over 
general worries about making false claims. 
Human properties and the null hypothesis
     As animals, humans and non-human animals share a number of biological, 
morphological, and relational properties, as well as some psychological properties such 
as the ability to fear (e.g. a predator) or desire (e.g. food). No experimental study is 
needed to draw these conclusions, even if they are based on behavioral observations of 
animals—perhaps the same kinds of observations we use to justify the notion that other 
humans experience fear and desire. Other features are thought by some to be special 
kinds of human traits, including psychological states such as beliefs, personality traits 
such as confidence or timidity, emotions such as happiness or grief, social organizational 
properties such as culture or friendship, and moral behaviors such as cooperation or 
punishment. Why are these properties more problematic than the others? A recent 
answer is that the problematic properties are those identified via interpretation, or 
folk psychological properties (Penn & Povinelli 2007; Povinelli & Giambrone 1997; 
Povinelli & Vonk 2003, 2004). The “insidious role that introspective intuitions and folk 
psychology play” in comparative cognition research is identified as being at the heart of 
the anthropomorphic approach to the science (Penn & Povinelli 2007, 732). The worry 
appears to be that folk psychological concepts are introspective explanations for human 
behavior that are then attributed to animals in analogous situations. They are problematic 
attributions in the first place because they are based on possibly false folk account of 
the cause of human behavior. Then, to make matters worse, those same properties are 
attributed to animals.
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     We think that identifying the special human properties as folk psychological fails to 
do the work that the selective skeptics need it to do; the distinction between folk 
psychological concepts and scientific psychological concepts will not map onto the 
distinction between anthropomorphic human properties and shared properties. Consider 
that folk psychology is “(a) a set of attributive, explanatory, and predictive practices, and 
(b) a set of notions or concepts used in these practices” (Von Eckardt 1995, 300). The 
practices of folk psychology include things such as predicting, explaining, justifying, 
evaluating, and coordinating behavior. And the concepts of folk psychology include 
theoretical mental entities such as beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, emotions, 
sensations, goals, and personality traits. If the selective skeptics were to identify folk 
psychological terms as anthropomorphic, they would have to accept that application of 
any folk psychological term to an animal is impermissible. But the skeptics cannot claim 
that any use of folk psychological language is problematic, because they make great use 
of many folk psychological concepts in their scientific papers—concepts including 
memory, goals, desires, emotions such as fear, and even beliefs4 . Since the selective 
skeptics help themselves to some folk psychological concepts in order to do science, 
they cannot consistently dismiss any use of folk psychology as unscientific. The 
selective skeptic cannot sustain a general worry about the use of folk psychology in 
animal cognition research, and so the special properties cannot be identified as 
coextensive with folk psychological properties. 
     Given that there is no systematic account of what makes certain human properties 
special, we conclude that there is no justification for forming the null hypothesis in terms 
of animals not having so-called “higher” properties, or in terms of animals not having 
folk psychological properties. To form the null hypothesis in such ways is to make a 
problematic assumption about the very issue under investigation. 
 
Types of errors
     In animal cognition research, like psychology more generally, some kinds of errors 
are thought to be worse than others. Students of psychology are taught very early in 
their training that committing a Type-I error is worse than committing a Type-II error. 
These errors are identified in terms of the null hypothesis being investigated, and are 
often understood such that a Type-I error is a false positive and a Type-II error is a false 
negative.
     Sober suggests that the methodological position of preferring Type-II errors is the 
position of preferring the bias we call anthropectomy over the bias of anthropomorphism, 
and it seems the skeptic would agree with that analysis. We disagree.
     Consider the typical definitions:
   Type-I Error – Rejecting a null hypothesis when it is in fact true.
   Type-II Error – Failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is in fact false 5 . 
Here, the null hypothesis is taken to be the default situation; it is what is assumed unless 
and until investigation shows it to be false, and it can never be proven true. In the case of 
animal cognition, it is almost always the case that the null hypothesis is that animals do 
not share the special human properties. Thus, whereas a Type-1 Error involves making 
a false claim (e.g. claiming that some Fs are Gs when in fact no Fs are Gs), a Type-II 
Error does not; it is merely a refusal to make a true claim (e.g. not claiming that some Fs 
are Gs when in fact some Fs are Gs).
     In psychology, Type-I and Type-II errors are defined in terms of the null hypothesis 
in such a way that Type-I errors – of which mistaken anthropomorphism is an 
example – are false claims, whereas Type-II errors are not. The problem is that when 
investigators go out of their way to avoid Type-I Errors, they not only run the risk of 
committing Type-II errors, but they also run the risk of committing the much more 
serious Type-IIA error, which we define as claiming that no Fs are Gs when in fact 
some Fs are Gs. Anthropectomy involves a claim about the nonexistence of a property. 
It is not a position of agnosticism, and so it is a mistake to prefer anthropectomy to 
anthropomorphism.
     To put the same point in a slightly different way, we think it is a mistake – a serious 
mistake having to do with the application of psychological methodology – to both:
   (a) hold that Type-I errors are more serious than Type-II errors, and
   (b) view Type-I errors as errors of anthropomorphism and Type-II errors as errors of 
         anthropectomy.
To see why, consider again how we might define the two kinds of error:
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   Type-I error = rejection of a null hypothesis when it is in fact true.
Understood this way, a Type-I error is indeed a false claim to be avoided. So far, so 
good. The problem for the skeptic can be put in terms of a dilemma concerning the 
definition of Type-II errors. Either:
   (Horn 1) Type-II error = failure to reject a null hypothesis when it is in fact false. 
   or
   (Horn 2) Type-II error = acceptance of a null hypothesis when it is in fact false.
If the skeptic takes on (Horn 1) of the dilemma, then she has good reason to think that 
Type-II errors are less serious than Type-I errors, but she has no reason to think that the 
skeptical hypothesis about psychological properties of animals should count as the null 
hypothesis. In its original formulation, the null hypothesis is a hypothesis that reflects 
what is expected to be the norm, and against which the researcher is looking for a 
statistically significant discrepancy (Neyman & Pearson 1928; 1967). However, in many 
cases there is no data on the norm, and in that case a typical textbook rule for setting up a 
good hypothesis is to choose a “dull or disappointing out-come…a boring result” (Garner 
2005, 140). It is difficult to see how or why Garner’s advice should be followed in the 
case of animal cognition research. It is true that some people would find it amazing if 
mere beasts shared our capacity to read others’ minds, for example. But others would 
find it equally amazing if nonhuman animals, especially those who are very closely 
genetically related to humans, lacked all of our psychological properties. Even if we 
were to try to follow the textbook advice, we would be at a loss in determining whether 
the skeptical or optimistic hypothesis should be the null hypothesis. We conclude the 
selective skeptic cannot accept (Horn 1) of the dilemma, because it does not permit 
identification of some properties as uniquely human.  
     If, on the other hand, the skeptic accepts (Horn 2), then she is free to deem the 
skeptical hypothesis the null hypothesis, but then she has no reason to think that Type-
II errors are less serious than Type-I errors. Under the (Horn 2) definition, both types of 
error are false claims, and it is perfectly legitimate for a researcher to choose something 
like “animals do not have psychological properties” as her null hypothesis, but it is not 
legitimate for her to think that accepting this hypothesis when it is in fact false is better 
than rejecting it when it is in fact true. Now, the same researcher might choose “animals 
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do have psychological properties” as her null hypothesis. The lesson just is that once 
Type-I and Type-II errors are made symmetrical, neither error is worse than the other. 
And since the errors are defined in terms of the null hypothesis, it follows that there is 
no direct epistemic reason to choose the skeptical hypothesis as the null hypothesis and 
no reason to choose the optimistic hypothesis as the null hypothesis. It’s a wash.
     Either way, the claim that the risk of anthropectomy is less troubling than the risk of 
anthropomorphism is unwarranted.
Choosing the null
     Like de Waal and Sober, we think that the methods of comparative cognition result in 
a bias against attributing special human properties to animals. However, we don’t think 
that this bias is the result of a correct use of the methodological rule of thumb that Type-
II errors are to be preferred to Type-I errors so much as it is a problem with identifying 
the null hypothesis in the first place. 
     The selective skeptics may reply to our argument that anthropectomy is as bad an 
error as anthropomorphism by reaffirming their status as skeptics rather than slayers—
they may claim that they do not deny the existence of special human properties in 
animals, and hence are not open to the charge of anthropectomy, but that they simply 
remain agnostic. However, that response isn’t consistent with the sorts of claims the 
selective skeptics make. Take, for example, the last two sentences in a recent paper 
coauthored by Povinelli: “…whatever “good trick” (Dennett 1996) was responsible for 
the advent of human beings’ ability to reinterpret the world in a symbolic-relational 
fashion, it evolved in only one lineage – ours.  Nonhuman animals didn’t (and still 
don’t) get it” (Penn et al. 2008, 129). This isn’t a cherry-picked example, and such 
negative claims abound in selective skeptics’ writing. It shouldn’t be surprising that such 
claims are made, when selective skeptics such as Povinelli identify the division between 
themselves and other animal cognition researchers as a division between those who 
emphasize the differences and those who emphasize the similarities between humans 
and animals. The selective skeptics are unwarranted in making anthropectic claims 
based on the standards of the Neyman and Pearson hypothesis testing method, and by 
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making such claims they do a disservice to the science of animal cognition research.  
     Nonetheless, the worry about anthropomorphism can offer a useful corrective to 
animal cognition research. While no general prohibition against using folk psychology 
in animal cognition can be justified in the face of current practice, given the ubiquity of 
such terms in scientific psychology, the worry about folk psychology does point to the 
need to have well-defined terms in hypotheses as well as in interpretations of results. 
We must try to avoid using fuzzy language to describe animal behavior or cognition, 
even when the functions and the mechanisms of such behavior or cognitive capacities 
are not well understood in humans. When we use the same term to describe baboon 
friendship and human friendship, and the term has not been operationalized in the same 
way in its application to humans and nonhumans, its careless use may have unintended 
implications. Researchers can avoid unintended implications by carefully choosing 
the terms they use to interpret animal behavior, and by reminding us that some terms, 
like friendship, refer to a range of human relationships that differ from one another 
in innumerable ways (across age ranges, across cultures, etc.). This task is not unlike 
the task taken on by anthropologists who need language to describe culturally distinct 
human behavior (Andrews 2009).
     Researches should set aside any worry about special human psychological, social, or 
normative properties, given the difficulty in even identifying what such properties might 
be. Rather, animal cognition researchers who want to make comparisons across species 
should carefully identify the property of interest in the comparison species before they 
can ever begin to ask whether it exists in the target species. Some properties, such as the 
capacity for theory of mind, are still so poorly understood in the human case that it isn’t 
surprising that looking for them in animals has led to so much controversy. The better 
defined the question, the better the science. While that is a general principle that extends 
beyond animal cognition research, it is one that bears repeating in this context.
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Notes
1.  We can categorize those skeptics who are particularly worried about anthropomorphism into two 
types: categorical skeptics who think that animal cognition research cannot be good science, and 
selective skeptics who think that some kinds of attributions are not justified. Many of the defenses 
of animal cognition research have addressed categorical skeptics, such as J.S. Kennedy (1992), 
who think that animal cognition research is an unscientific field of research. These skeptics think 
that animals are not the right sorts of things to apply the concepts to. For categorical skeptics, the 
charge of anthropomorphism is a pre-empirical one. They think that researchers in animal cognition 
are making a category mistake by asking whether animals have certain properties (for this critique 
see Bekoff & Allen 1997; Fisher 1990, 1991; Keeley 2004).
2.  “The…cladistic rationale applied to humans and their close relative should lead us to adopt 
cognitive similarity as the default position, thus making anthropomorphism a virtual nonissue” (de 
Waal 1999, 259). 
3.  “If the dramatic resculpting of the human body and brain that occurred over the past 4 million 
years or so involved the evolution of some qualitatively new cognitive systems, then this insistence 
on focusing on similarities will leave comparative psychologists unable to investigate hallmarks of 
their own species—or chimpanzees, for that matter.  It [seeking to find similarities across species] 
is an agenda that does justice to no one” (Povinelli & Bering 2002, 116). Similar concerns are 
shared to some degree by other animal cognition researchers (e.g. Shettleworth 2010a, 2010b, Silk 
2002, Blumberg & Wasserman 1995, Wynn 2004, 2007).
4.  Povinelli and Vonk accept that chimpanzees have beliefs; they write “everyone agrees that the 
chimpanzee’s mind contains mental representations” (Povinelli & Vonk 2003, 158).
5.  See, for example, Garner 2005:  “Type-I error is rejecting a null hypothesis that is true.  Type-II 
(or beta) error is failing to reject a null hypothesis that is, in fact, false” (135).  But note that this 
way of defining Type-II errors is not universal.  See Fisher 1971, who defines “errors of the second 
kind” in terms of “accepting the null hypothesis ‘when it is false’” (17, emphasis added).  For 
reasons that should become clear soon, it is of the utmost importance to determine whetherType-II 
errors should be defined in terms of “failing to reject” or in terms of “accepting”, for these phrases 
describe two entirely different doxastic states.  Our assessment of the problem with much animal 
cognition research is that it is unclear whether this important distinction is made in actual practice 
by researchers.
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